On October 13, the national EIA Day took place. Thijs Kraassenberg and Steffie Bes were there to lead a workshop on disinformation. The central question was: ‘How can we deal with disinformation in our work?’ An important question—one that, as it turned out, has several answers.

Disinformation, fake news, conspiracy theories, incitement; these are all terms that regularly appear in the (social) media. The phenomenon is often mentioned in the news, during talk shows, in debates in the House of Representatives, on social media, and during coffee with family. But what exactly is disinformation? And what is it not? In answering these questions, we will focus on disinformation as a phenomenon in our field and how we, as environmental professionals, can deal with it.

The national government has the following definition: “Disinformation is untrue, inaccurate, or misleading information that is intentionally created and disseminated to make money or to harm a person, social group, organization, or country.” Therefore, accidentally spreading incorrect information is not the same as disinformation, but is considered misinformation. Other fact streams, expressing opinions, selectively highlighting information, satire, parody, or criticism are also not forms of disinformation. Furthermore, disinformation is not inherently prohibited. The protection of freedom of expression sometimes outweighs the fact that something can be labeled as disinformation. This only changes if there is a link to incitement of violence or discrimination, for example.

In practice, it's difficult to distinguish what is not disinformation. We see the label "disinformation" appearing more and more often, even when it's not always appropriate. For example, we all tend to selectively highlight information at times, forgetting or deliberately omitting the rest.

Distinguishing features of disinformation

When we want to know if something is disinformation or not, we mainly need to look at the intention. The intention behind the spread largely determines whether something is disinformation or not. This also sometimes makes the assessment and distinction from misinformation difficult. There are several motives to consider why someone might want to spread disinformation; this can range from political goals, economic lobbying, downplaying harmful effects, or it can be a cry for attention. Sowing doubt can be both an end in itself and a means to, for example, create confusion and uncertainty in order to influence people's attitudes. This is part of the problem with disinformation; it doesn't have to be believed to do its work. And therein lies an important link to our work, where we all encounter disinformation or misinformation to a greater or lesser extent. If incorrect information starts to play a role, for example about the effects of a project, it is difficult to rectify.

Misinformation throughout the ages

From Roman battle reports, propaganda pamphlets during the Eighty Years' War, to news coverage of the Vietnam War, the intentional spread of disinformation is not a new phenomenon. However, with the rise of the internet, social media, and the functioning of algorithms, confirmation bias has significantly increased, and people are increasingly finding themselves in a specific information bubble. These bubbles prevent other perspectives and ensure we receive confirmation rather than counterarguments. There are concerns that these effects are so significant that they pose a real threat to democracies, according to, for example, former president Barack Obama.

Circumstances play a role

We also see the influence of disinformation and its effects increasing in our work. What is important when dealing with disinformation is the realization that it doesn't just appear out of nowhere, and that those who spread disinformation are not always ‘crackpots.’ Dismissing the spreaders as crazy actually fuels polarization, which is fertile ground for disinformation.

Looking at our practice, we see a number of characteristics of situations where the likelihood of disinformation succeeding increases.

First, we often see the spread of misinformation happening when people or groups feel hurt or threatened in their core interests. This creates great tension. If the tension rises too high, it can be seen as legitimate by the owner of these interests to go over the line.

We also see that people are more susceptible to disinformation because it is more appealing than the complex, nuanced alternative. If the disinformation is easier to understand and addresses fears or concerns shared within groups, recipients often see it as confirmation. If the information aligns with ideas or worldviews that one already holds, it is more readily accepted as true. This is also known as confirmation bias.

Finally, it doesn't help when people feel powerless in a process that affects their interests. Combined with a low trust in people in influential positions, this has consequences for people's attitudes. This is about the feeling that the competent authority is unable to stand up for your interests; and that those who decide are not considered capable of doing the right things.

Disinformation in the form of resistance

The combination of threats to core interests, asymmetrical power relations, and low trust in people in influential positions or the system can lead people to resist. One of those ways is to spread disinformation. The conscious intention to, for example, smear an initiative or person means that we position the behavior associated with this as a form of resistance or violence. When dealing with a conflict, people consciously choose to use means other than, for example, dialogue, legal action, or political influence. To deal with conflicts, large and small, we distinguish conflictarena's. Conflicts can be resolved in these different arenas, and behavior in one arena also influences the others. If parties do not feel heard in the dialogue or political arena, they may move to other arenas that seem appealing.

Dealing with disinformation

As a professional, there are several things you can do to deal with disinformation. We distinguish between prevention and cure.

Prevention

First, regarding the prevention of disinformation. An important tool we have is thorough preparation. When dealing with highly sensitive subjects that generate significant tension, we must account for this in our strategy. This requires empathy. Where do we see core interests under pressure? Which groups have significant stakes? How do we bring them to the table effectively and representatively? Do people feel represented? Answers to these questions should enable us to establish contact as early as possible. Subsequently, it's crucial to understand how these tense subjects are perceived and experienced. In a follow-up, it can be agreed how to collaborate further and which questions need to be answered, giving these individuals the most comprehensive role possible. A follow-up where different perspectives can coexist without causing harm. As professionals, it is our responsibility to monitor internally and externally that we adhere to established ground rules. This ensures a shared challenge rather than an "us versus them" dynamic.

Heal

But what do you do when you encounter disinformation during the process? Before we make a judgment about disinformation in our projects, it is important to first form an impression. We cannot judge without knowing the motives. Therefore, we must make a diagnosis. The same reaction does not always fit. Does it occur more often or does it happen only once? Is it deliberate to harm, or is there a great need for attention behind it? Is it about a well-considered strategy or is it amateurish blundering? An open attitude and genuine interest in the motives are important, also in contact with the person or group concerned. Making a negative judgment can always be done later. Sometimes this requires the necessary self-control, moving past actions and no longer holding it against someone. For the sake of the quality of the follow-up.

If this does not lead to improvement, or if the disinformation is of a harmful or threatening nature, then ensure that you, as a person and organization, are resilient. Make sure the foundation is in good order, that the connection and cooperation with other parties remain strong, and that you, as a person, organization, or process, can remain firm. We call this the ability to absorb shock.

Further develop

Despite disinformation not being a new phenomenon, social media has initiated a new development. This means that dealing with it requires not only effort from us as professionals but also from institutions that safeguard our safety or organizations we protect. Much is still unknown; what is the long-term impact? What tools can we further develop to combat disinformation? Various developments are also taking place in the area of (European) laws and regulations. What are possible solutions to limit disinformation through laws and regulations without impairing freedom of speech? How will the latest developments surrounding artificial intelligence and deep fakes change society?

In addition, it remains custom work. Judging someone's actions as disinformation can always be done later; we need to investigate it. It makes quite a difference whether it's a professional, organized group deliberately using the means or if it's someone in distress. And when do you choose to (try to) remain connected with those spreading disinformation, and where do you draw the line? These are all choices that will have to be made on a case-by-case basis. Thinking about possible situations beforehand and establishing frameworks together helps to make considered choices.

In short, some tools, but also still a lot of questions on how to deal with disinformation. We will continue to delve into this phenomenon. If there are suggestions for our field or if important questions have been missed, we would love to hear them.

Director

Thijs Kraassenberg