Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas refuses to negotiate directly with Israel over his own state; Residents are halting their discussions with Schiphol Airport regarding conditions for growth; and if the Province of Groningen wants to talk about nitrogen, farmers say: ‘We will not sit at the table with a noose around our necks’.

Just a few examples of conflicts where dialogue initiatives are taken, but the dialogue fails to get off the ground or cannot be sustained.
Remarkable, because dialogue led by an independent facilitator is generally understood as a ‘safe space’ where parties can engage in conversation based on equality and mutual understanding. That sounds inviting. So why do some parties refuse to participate in a dialogue? And can a facilitator do anything about that?

The examples above have in common that there is an asymmetrical power relationship between the parties. This power relationship can lead to a dialogue not being perceived as equal. In fact, in the experience of participants, a dialogue table can degenerate into yet another battleground where some parties are better off than others. For example, one party may have an advantage due to knowledge, rational persuasion, strategic framing, and agenda setting. While other parties feel powerless because they have poor insight into the situation, struggle to articulate their interests, are afraid of being talked into things, and the conversation doesn't seem to be about what is important to them.

With that image in mind, the powerless party fears that a dialogue, initially aimed at constructive cooperation, will in reality lead to unilateral compliance with the powerful party's interests. Driven by that fear and feelings of powerlessness, parties may appear unreasonably stubborn, or even walk away from the table because they believe their interests can be better served on a ‘playing field’ with different rules. And those playing fields exist.

In literature about Social movements Is such a playing field also called an ‘arena’ (Jasper, 2015)? Examples of arenas in which a conflict can be resolved are, besides the dialogue table: politics, the (social) media, the courtroom, and resistance & violence. These different arenas are depicted in the figure above.

Awareness of the other arenas is important because dialogue does not take place in a vacuum without other factors influencing the outcome. Often, parties encounter each other in more than one arena. What happens in one arena then influences the other arena. For example, parliamentary questions, an opinion piece to be published, soldiers at the border, or a judge's ruling can determine the power dynamics at the negotiating table and the course of the dialogue.

Parties who feel powerless at the dialogue table can also choose to walk away from the table entirely and channel all their energy into resolving the conflict in alternative arenas. Usually, they do this with the conviction that they will achieve a better outcome there than through dialogue. It is in these other arenas that parties seek out their BATNA: Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (see this blog for a clear explanation of BATNA). Femke VergeestThe arenas thus also offer an analytical framework for the process facilitator to steer towards an agreement that yields equal or higher value than their BATNA for all parties.

However, that will not always be enough to keep parties at the negotiating table. Even if the weaker party has no guarantee of a better alternative than the agreement on the table, an agreement reached under duress and that does not feel fair will not be readily accepted. The weaker party may then still choose not to agree to the terms and try their luck in another arena.

Therefore, to keep parties at the table, more is needed than an agreement that is better for each party than their BATNA. The power asymmetry between parties cannot simply be resolved at the dialogue table. Nevertheless, it is the facilitator's task to organize the process as fairly and transparently as possible. For example, the facilitator must ensure that parties agree in advance on ground rules and common criteria that are considered fair by all parties and to which an agreement must at least meet. Furthermore, the facilitator ensures that important issues are not left undiscussed and that the interests of the parties are acknowledged.

Finally, parties can still feel powerless even in a fair and transparent process. For example, because their beliefs are not shared, because they cannot keep up with the substance, or because they cannot fully understand their rights. Process components such as ‘joint fact finding’ and/or independent legal or technical advice can then help. This way, less powerful parties can also participate in the dialogue as full stakeholders. Ultimately, this is in the interest of all parties, as it fosters mutual trust, prevents a flight to other arenas, and increases the possibilities for value creation.

Senior consultant

Robin Schram